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Abstract: 
In this paper, we consider whether it is the gender of the decision maker or the extent of 
agency that they wield that is crucial to increasing household welfare. This is an important 
question as development policy is often formed on the basis that placing resources in the 
hands of women results in greater household welfare. Indonesia provides the ideal 
opportunity to study this issue because it is home to ethnic groups with very different 
gender norms from male dominance (the patrilineal Batak) to female dominance (the 
matrilineal Minangkabau). Using IFLS data for three rounds, we consider the impact of 
decision-making by the dominant spouse on household expenditure on education. We find 
that, in Indonesia, when the dominant spouse (male or female) has sole control of decision-
making, there is an overall negative impact on education expenditure. This leads us to argue 
that it is more important to consider the issue of spousal dominance, than wholly to focus 
on gender.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we study the impact that unequal agency within a household has on a 
particular aspect of household welfare, expenditure on education. There is a large literature 
that argues that household welfare is improved when mothers have more agency within the 
household (see for example Agarwal, 1997; de la Briere, Hallman, & Quisumbing, 2003; 
Duflo, 2012; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 1999; A. Rahman, 2013; M. M. Rahman, Mostofa, & 
Hoque, 2014; Seebens & Sauer, 2007). Since this literature is predicated on the dominant 
patriarchal, patrilineal model of households, these results have been interpreted to mean 
that increasing women’s agency will improve household welfare. This leaves open the issue 
of whether it is gender which is important or an increase in agency for the less dominant 
spouse (men in matrilineal societies and women in patrilineal societies). This is what we 
analyze in this paper using data from Indonesia. 
Indonesia provides the ideal opportunity to study this issue because it is home to ethnic 
groups with very different gender norms (Blackburn, 2004) ranging from the patrilineal 
(Batak) to the bilateral (Javanese) and the matrilineal (Minangkabau).The Indonesia Family 
Life Survey (IFLS), which we use in this paper, provides information at the household and 
community level allowing us to analyze the impact of agency within the household across a 
range of kinship systems. In this context, we consider whether there is any symmetry 
between the agency wielded by the ‘weaker’ partner amongst the patrilineal Batak (women) 
and the matrilineal Minangkabau (men). We ask whether women are less powerful than 
men in making certain decisions even within the matrilineal Minangkabau. We also ask 
whether the power wielded by the dominant spouse has different impacts across these 
groups. Our results indicate that cooperation between the partners is more beneficial in 
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Indonesia than enhancing the power of either parent in the household, particularly where 
that parent is already powerful. Our findings confirm those of Basu and Ray (2002) who 
found that, in the context of child labor, household welfare was greatest in households 
where both parents were equally powerful.  
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, while there is a lot of research 
on women’s agency in developing countries, there is much less on shared agency between 
spouses. There is also less literature analyzing the agency wielded by men when they are the 
‘weaker’ partner. This is not surprising, given that many systems across the world are 
patrilineal and patriarchal. In this paper, we use the different kinship systems in Indonesia to 
study the impact of agency (of both men and women) on household expenditure on 
education and the heterogeneity of this agency across communities.  
Secondly, our analysis enables us to explicitly consider the role of female decision-making 
and compare it with that of men. There is some evidence (Ashraf, 2009; Gneezy, Leonard, & 
List, 2009) that there are parallels amongst women in matrilineal societies and men in 
patrilineal societies. Ashraf (2009), for instance, finds that “women whose husbands control 
the savings decisions in the household behave as the men whose wives control the savings 
decision” (p.1247). In the context of a country like Indonesia where there is greater balance 
with regards to agency between men and women, such an analysis is likely to be especially 
revealing.  
Our third contribution is methodological. The study of women’s agency has, until recently, 
used indirect proxies like the relative income, the relative education or the relative age of 
spouses as a proxy for the power they wield in making decisions within the household 
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(Anderson & Eswaran, 2009; Felkey, 2013; Quisumbing, 2003). More recently, with the 
popularity of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) datasets, researchers have 
measured women’s agency through responses to questions about their freedom to move 
outside the home, their ability to make decisions regarding child health or their acceptance 
of violence from partners (for example Agarwal, 1997; Aizer, 2010; Jejeebhoy, 2002). While 
the DHS measures are very revealing of autonomy in some contexts, they have been 
criticized for ignoring the increased responsibility that such freedoms entail for women. 
Basu and Koolwal (2005), for instance, argue that the real measure of autonomy is not 
whether women have the freedom to do certain things but what would happen if a woman 
chose to ignore these freedoms. In particular, they conclude that true freedom requires 
some measure of self-indulgence and the freedom to do relatively unproductive things 
(listen to radio, visit friends) and to set aside money for personal use, for example. In this 
paper, we use a different, more direct agency measure – the decisions made by men and 
women across different domains within the household. While other researchers (Anderson 
& Eswaran, 2009; Fernandez, Della Giusta, & Kambhampati, 2015; Garikipati, 2008; 
Rammohan & Johar, 2009) have used this measure, it is relatively underused despite 
providing us with a direct measure of the impact that female agency has on the quality of 
decisions within the household.  
We structure our paper as follows. We begin with a review of the literature that we draw 
on, focusing on the concepts of agency, gender and ethnicity in Section 2. We then describe 
our data and methodology in Section 3 before moving on to the results in Section 4 and the 
discussion in Section 5.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Gender and agency 
In this paper, we focus on a particular form of power, agency, which refers to an individual’s 
ability to act on a goal deemed to be important (Iversen, 2003; Kabeer, 1999; A. Sen, 1985, 
2001) and to make strategic life choices (Kabeer, 1999).  We measure agency by analyzing 
decisions made within households.  
Unlike the early unitary models (see Becker, 1974; Becker, 1981), it is now commonly 
accepted that a household is not a unitary entity governed by a single decision-maker. 
Household interactions seldom take the binary form of either cooperation or discord which 
is central to many bargaining models because “the simultaneity of cooperation and conflict 
in gender divisions has often been trivialized in the formal economic literature” (Sen, 1990, 
p.131). Sen therefore proposed the idea of cooperative conflict, where household members 
cooperate (and thereby add to the total resources available to the household) and 
experience conflict (the process of dividing these resources) (Sen, 1987b, 1990). Of course, 
there is no single co-operative outcome and a person’s ability to bargain (often gendered 
and affected by perceived contributions to the household) is crucial in how they fare in the 
co-operative outcome. Within these models, women are seen as more concerned about 
family welfare than their own (Sen, 1987a).  
Sen’s co-operative conflict model has been criticized for attributing false consciousness to 
women (Jackson, 2013). Agarwal (1997) also argues that women identify their personal 
welfare with that of their husband and children because they are socialized towards 
meeting collective needs. She illustrates this through a comparison of the matrilineal and 
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matrilocal Khaasi group in India and their patrilineal and patrilocal peers. Experimental 
evidence (Iversen, Jackson, Kebede, Munro, & Verschoor, 2011) reinforces these findings 
that women neither identify more with household interests nor, therefore, do they 
contribute more to the common pool than men. Jackson (2013) concludes that “the 
complex interdependencies of husbands and wives in diverse ethnographies suggest a more 
uncertain balance of power within a marriage than the co-operative conflict model implies”. 
In research on South Asia, Furuta and Salway (2006) argue that spousal autonomy is further 
circumscribed by interdependencies across and within families. 
The family sociology literature (Rosenbluth, Steil, & Whitcomb, 1998) sees decision making 
as a measure of relationship equality with a number of studies concluding that equal sharing 
in decision making is beneficial for relationships (Gray-Little & Burks, 1983; Lange & Worrell, 
1990). However, the literature distinguishes between significant and less important 
decisions. Thus, Safilios-Rothschild (1970) talked of ‘orchestration power’ (making important 
decisions which do not infringe on a partner’s time but affect the household’s lifestyle) and 
‘implementation power’ (the time consuming but less important decisions). In Western 
middle class families, for instance, routine housekeeping decisions were made by the wife 
but career-related decisions were made by the husband (Edgell, 1980; Steil & Weltman, 
1991). Similarly, Fox and Murry (2000) conclude that although couples might see their 
marriages as equal and their family roles as egalitarian, husbands were more likely to retain 
an upper hand in decision making processes. Only rarely (Bartley, Blanton, & Gilliard, 2005) 
do wives see themselves as exerting more influence than their husbands in dual career 
households.  
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In the context of developing countries, Basu and Ray (2002) find that child labor in Nepal is 
least likely to occur in households where there is a balance of power between spouses. They 
extend a collective bargaining model to include child labor and hypothesize a U-shaped 
relationship between women’s agency and child labor – in other words, as women’s agency 
increases, child labor will fall initially and then rise (see also Basu, 2006). They begin with 
the assumption that both parents dislike sending their children out to work. Their result 
hinges on the fact that when both spouses are equally powerful, neither the father nor the 
mother benefits exclusively from the additional income earned by their children. 
Rammohan and Robertson (2012) also find that educational outcomes are better in 
communities where the norms favor equal inheritance. 
Using earlier rounds of the IFLS dataset that we use in this paper, Beegle, Frankenberg, and 
Thomas (2001) analyze the impact of bargaining power on prenatal and delivery care in 
Indonesia. Their measure of bargaining power is based on relative ownership of assets by 
the partners, their relative education and family backgrounds (which are seen to determine 
outside options). They find that while the distribution of economic power within a 
household significantly influences prenatal and delivery care, the impact of relative 
education and family background is mixed. They conclude that “power is multifaceted and 
each indicator captures a different dimension of the complex interactions that take place 
between husband and wife as they negotiate investments in reproductive health” (p.143).  
More recent studies have used more direct measures of agency (Adato, Brière, Mindek, & 
Quisumbing, 2003; Fernandez et al., 2015; Mabsout & van Staveren, 2010; Quisumbing, 
2003) facilitated by the availability of household decision-making data. Analyzing the use of 
maternal health services in Bangladesh using this measure, Story and Burgard (2012) find 
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the husband’s involvement in decision making is especially important because male 
decisions on large household purchases and husband only decision making is less beneficial 
to the use of maternal health services than joint decision making. A number of other studies 
have suggested that greater equality in decision making (Kabeer, 2001) or joint household 
decision making (Mullany, Hindin, & Becker, 2005) may yield better outcomes.  
For the purposes of this research, we focus on three main ethnic groups, the patriarchal and 
patrilineal Batak, the bilateral Javanese and the matrilineal Minangkabau.  
2.2 Kinship systems in Indonesia 
Indonesia is culturally diverse and made up of hundreds of ethnic groups (Sakai, 2010; 
Statistics Indonesia & Macro International, 2008). While women in Indonesia are frequently 
said to have more agency than South or East Asian women (Bulbeck, 1997; Koning, Nolten, 
Rodenburg, & Saptari, 2000; Saptari, 2000), this differs across ethnic groups. In this 
research, we focus on three groups – the Batak, the Javanese and the Minangkabau – which 
represent very different social structures. The Javanese are largely bilateral in terms of kin-
group while the Batak are strongly patriarchal and patrilineal and the Minangkabau are 
matrilineal. These broad descriptors obscure considerable heterogeneity within groups. In 
this paper, however, we highlight the systematic regularities within each group while 
acknowledging the differences across them. We will consider each of these groups in more 
detail in the rest of this section before we turn to our analysis of the impact of decision 
making within these groups. 
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2.2.1 The Javanese 
Javanese women are often said to be relatively more powerful than many of their 
counterparts from other ethnic groups. This is typically attributed to their economic 
prowess, role as managers of their households, ability to earn as much as, if not more than, 
their spouses and their equal inheritance rights (Brenner, 1995; Geertz, 1961; Hatley, 1990; 
Keeler, 1990; Kevane & Levine, 2000; Weix, 2000) though this view is not without its critics 
(Brenner, 1995; Koning, 2004; Koning et al., 2000; Wolf, 2000).  
Javanese husbands are expected to give the majority (if not all) of their earnings to their 
wives for use in managing the household (Brenner, 1995). In the event of divorce, Javanese 
women take with them all the property that they brought to the marriage and are entitled 
to half of all jointly owned property and assets (Brenner, 1995). But, traditionally fathers 
have the final say with regards to key decisions such as their children’s marriage, education 
and employment (Elmhirst, 2000). In recent years, Javanese women have been increasingly 
confronted with a patriarchal state ideology which ignores the multiplicity of their roles as 
family provider, wife, mother and spouse as well as any community roles they might have as 
elders or leaders (Koning, 2004). Studies also suggest the ideal Javanese woman is expected 
to focus on all aspects of men’s comfort: she should be faithful to her spouse but willing to 
share him with other women, caring and attentive to her family and in-laws, skilled at 
women’s work, simple and good at making herself beautiful and fulfilling men’s desires 
(Astuti, 2005). This suggests that while we might expect Javanese women to have significant 
agency in economic decision making, this agency is also increasingly circumscribed by social 
and legal norms in other spheres of life. 
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1.2.2 The Batak 
There are six Batak communities around Lake Toba. While there is significant diversity 
amongst these groups, all are patriarchal and patrilineal, with daughters seen as less 
entitled to education than sons (Kevane & Levine, 2000) and excluded from inheriting land 
and assets (Kevane & Levine, 2000; Portier & Slaats, 1987; Rodenburg, 2000). Even after 
marriage, women retain practical responsibilities for their patrilineal kin-group including 
mediating on inheritance issues despite being unable to inherit themselves (Portier & Slaats, 
1987).  
Batak women are typically the least empowered if judged by their access to resources, their 
rights over property and children and their mobility and residence. They must defer to their 
male elders in all important decisions. On divorce, they lose their rights to their children and 
to joint property and assets if they initiate the divorce (Rodenburg, 2000). While it is 
possible for women to ask for support and help from their brothers, this is a precarious 
safety net as, in the event of a refusal, women are expected to accept the rejection and 
avoid public confrontation (Rodenburg, 2000).  
1.2.3 The Minangkabau 
The Minangkabau, based predominantly in West Sumatra, form the second largest 
matrilineal population in the world (Kreager & Schroder-Butterfill, 2009). Women inherit 
and hold ancestral land, control economic production and are household heads. Men 
cannot inherit ancestral land and matrilines without daughters face extinction (Kreager & 
Schroder-Butterfill, 2009; Schwede, 1991). Both matrilineal descent and Islam are seen as 
being as of equal importance (Esten, 1993; Sanday, 2002). A large extended family of several 
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sub-lineages typically lives together with each nuclear family operating separately on some 
issues but coming together for kin-group decisions (Blackwood, 1995; Ihromi, 2005; 
Schwede, 1991).  
Minangkabau men do not have authority independent of the lineage but can exercise 
authority as the titular male representative (‘penghulu’) (Blackwood, 1995). In recent years, 
state laws have eroded Minangkabau women’s traditional inheritance rights (Noerdin, 2002) 
and male ‘adat’1 experts have reinforced these changes by downplaying the authority and 
role of senior women (Blackwood, 1995). This has been exacerbated by agricultural 
extension programs which attempt to impose patriarchal views by treating the men who 
work on their wives’ land as the landholders (Blackwood 1995). 
Young Minangkabau men are expected to migrate in search of their living to prove their 
worth (Kreager & Schroder-Butterfill, 2009) with education opening new opportunities away 
from agriculture for men (Reenen, 2000). Daughters traditionally remain in the village and 
live in their maternal homes on marriage. This has begun to change in recent years with 
more young women migrating in search of employment (Blackwood, 2007; Kreager & 
Schroder-Butterfill, 2009; Reenen, 2000). Husbands are seen as ‘guests’ in the homes of 
their wives as long as they pull their weight financially but Minangkabau marriages are 
evolving towards nuclear households living away from the wife’s matrikin (Chadwick, 1991). 
                                                          
1 This refers to custom and ethnicity based legal systems in Indonesia that govern a range of rights, obligations 
and expectations such as marriage and inheritance. ‘Adat’ laws remain very important despite the existence of 
religious and state legal systems (Buttenheim & Nobles, 2009). 
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Men are often described as caught between their conjugal families and their matrikin 
(Kreager & Schroder-Butterfill, 2009; Sanday, 2002). Men’s income typically pays for their 
children’s education with any excess income going to their maternal families (Blackwood, 
1995). Traditionally, maternal uncles had more authority within a matrikin than husbands 
and fathers (Kreager & Schroder-Butterfill, 2009; Sanday, 2002) but this is changing with 
husbands increasingly taking over economic obligations (Reenen, 2000; Schwede, 1991), 
providing both an important source of labor on their wife’s farms (Chadwick, 1991) and 
greater access to the market (Reenen, 2000). Despite these recent changes, however, the 
Minangkabau remain the group within which we might expect women to have the greatest 
agency in household decision making.  
As seen from the discussion above, there is considerable variation in gender roles and 
norms across the different ethnic groups (Blackburn, 2004) in Indonesia which makes it an 
ideal case in which to study women’s agency. There are also significant differences within 
each group and changes over time. In this paper, however, we focus on the differences 
between, rather than within, each group and control for changes over time by including 
time dummies.  
3. Data and methodology  
3.1 The data 
The IFLS is a representative, continuing longitudinal socioeconomic and health survey which 
has data on a broad range of demographic, social and economic issues including household 
decision-making (Frankenberg et al., 1995). The households included in the survey are taken 
from half of the 26 provinces, both rural and urban, and are representative of 83% of the 
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Indonesian population. Each wave of the IFLS has been administered to both the original 
households and to any split-offs from those households with a re-contact rate of 90.6% 
(Strauss, Witoelar, Sikoki, & Wattie, 2009). There are four waves of the IFLS – 1993, 1997, 
2000, 2007/8 – and the data used here forms an unbalanced panel spanning three time 
periods. We do not use data from IFLS1 as household decision-making information was not 
collected during the first wave. Several people in each household were interviewed, though 
the household decision-making questions were administered only to married couples, with 
both the household head and his or her spouse being interviewed (Strauss et al., 2009). The 
data identified the person making decisions within each household: fathers, mothers, jointly 
by both spouses or by other family members. In general, a very small proportion of decisions 
were made by parties other than the parents in this dataset.2 
In this paper, we include only households where both spouses are from the same ethnic 
group as in marriages across ethnic groups the dominant norms are likely to be unclear. We 
acknowledge that, as a result, the households in our research might be more conservative 
but feel this is appropriate as mixed marriages, in particular between the Batak and the 
Minangkabau, warrant a separate study. As we are interested in the impact of mothers’ and 
fathers’ decision-making on education expenditure within households, we exclude 
households with non-biological, school-aged children such as grandchildren or nieces and 
nephews. We also excluded 879 households where spouses entered or left (usually because 
of divorce or death). 
                                                          
2 Less than 10% of decisions relating to large household expenditure and small household expenditure were 
made by other decision-makers. Less than 15% of decisions relating to children and cash or gift-giving were 
made by other decision-makers while only a third of savings related decisions had no input from other 
decision-makers.  
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3.2 The methodology 
Our main research question is the extent to which the agency of the less dominant spouse 
might influence household expenditure on education. We also consider whether there is 
any symmetry between how women’s agency functions in a patrilineal group and men’s 
agency in a matrilineal group and ask what impact this might have on household 
expenditure on education. 
3.2.1 The dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is household expenditure on education, chosen as a measure of 
household welfare in Indonesia. While household welfare covers adult/child nutrition, 
children’s education, anthropometric measures, mobility or ownership of assets, we 
concentrate on educational expenditure for two reasons. First, education is seen as a 
significant factor in inter-generational economic and welfare outcomes and has therefore 
also been prioritized in the MDGs. Second, there is very little variability across households in 
Indonesia on measures like child vaccination rates or the number of meals eaten in a day by 
children,3 while prenatal care and maternal health has been studied by (Beegle et al., 2001) 
using the same dataset.  
                                                          
3 Using IFLS4, there was little variability in child vaccination rates which are relatively high in Indonesia (86.5% 
for BCG, 88.3% for polio, 83.6% for DPT, 77.5% for measles, 78.2% for Hepatitis B while 82.5% received Vitamin 
A supplements). With regards to food type and consumption, there was a lack of variability in the data with 
over 96.0% of children consuming at least two meals a day. 
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Education in Indonesia is compulsory up to the age of 15 and while free education4 is 
theoretically available, public schools levy a range of unofficial fees to cover costs (Kattan & 
Burnett, 2004; King, McGrath, & Rose, 2007). Parental fees and contributions constitute 
about 8% of school funding and there is social pressure on families to support schools 
(James, King, & Suryadi, 1996).  
Household expenditure on education as a proportion of total household expenditure 
therefore varies considerably across households (see Table 1 below). While there is no 
significant difference in average spending on education between the Batak and 
Minangkabau groups, there are statistically significant (albeit small) differences between the 
patrilineal Batak and the bilateral Javanese and between the Javanese and the 
Minangkabau. In our empirical analysis, we will consider these differences in more detail.  
Table 1 Mean of annual household education expenditure per school age child by ethnicity 
Variable Comparison of Batak 
and Javanese 
Comparison of Batak 
and Minangkabau 
Comparison of Javanese 
and Minangkabau 
Difference 
of means 
t-
statistics 
Difference 
of means 
t-
statistics 
Difference 
of means 
t-
statistics 
Nominal total 
education expenditure 
 
1,809,892 4.6687 -129,570 -0.0688 -1,939,462 -3.8060 
Real total education 
expenditure  
1,108,663 4.6352 -86,740 -0.0745 -1,195,403 -3.7978 
                                                          
4 Primary and junior high school education was made free in 2005 but entry into the scheme was voluntary and 
schools that entered the scheme faced gaps between running costs and the funding received from the 
government.  
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Our preferred model5 is:  
hhexpht = β1x1ht + β2x2ht + β3x3ht+ µht    
Where hhexp denotes the proportion of total household expenditure spent on education; h 
denotes a household (i=1, 2, ..... N); βk denotes the vector of parameters to be estimated 
(k=1,...4); x1 includes demographic characteristics (ethnicity, religion, parental education, 
number of children), x2 is financial resources (log of household income,6 parental 
employment status and asset ownership7), and x3, the autonomy variables. 
The model is estimated in two ways. In the first case, our autonomy variable (x3) is proxied 
by the relative age, income and education of the spouses which capture differences 
between the spouses. While these are blunt measures we include them in our preliminary 
estimation to provide a comparator to existing studies in the literature. Since relative 
education is time invariant, we estimate this model by including dummies for time (Table 4). 
This allows us to retain the time invariant variables in the model while also controlling for 
changes in economic, social and gender relations over time. This was a period of 
considerable change in Indonesia with the fall of the Soeharto government, the Asian 
financial crisis and changing gender attitudes within ethnic groups as discussed in Section 
2.2. and the election of the country’s first female President, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Despite 
the heterogeneity of social and gender norms8 across ethnic groups, the state is active in 
                                                          
5 We eliminate the unobserved household fixed effect using a within group fixed effect method, eliminating αh 
from the equation hhexpht = x’htβ+ αh + εht 
6 Household income is the log of total household income adjusted for inflation with IFLS2 used as the base. The 
IFLS collected data on wage related and non-wage related income.   
7 Asset ownership is a binary variable for home ownership. 
8 Norms here refer to expected and accepted ways of behaving within a particular society. 
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seeking to define gender roles (Jones, 2002; O'Shaughnessy, 2009), making households a 
locus of the conflict between official ideologies of gender relations9 and the multiplicity of 
indigenous gender identities,10 to varying extents (Blackburn, 2004; Blackwood, 1995; Jones, 
2002; Koning et al., 2000; Krier, 1995; O'Shaughnessy, 2009; Pfau-Effinger, 1998, 2004; 
Reenen, 2000; K. Sen, 1998). The time dummies in the estimations in Table 4 capture some 
of these effects.  
The second measure of decision making within the household is our preferred measure 
which provides a more nuanced and direct autonomy variable. These decision-making 
variables are time variant and capture many of the changes discussed above at household 
level. They also allow us to estimate this model with panel fixed effects methods.11 Our 
choice of fixed (rather than random) effects was confirmed by the Hausman test and 
reduces the problem of unobserved heterogeneity.  
We discuss these agency variables in more detail in the next section. 
2.2.2 Measuring agency  
Indirect measures of agency 
 
                                                          
9 This refers to State sponsored beliefs of appropriate behaviour for men and women either legally enshrined 
as in the 1974 Marriage Law or via propaganda like State Ibu-ism. 
10 This refers to a person’s sense of self. 
11 We are aware that fixed effects make a strong assumption of strict exogeneity. However, as the IFLS waves 
were not carried out in consecutive years with a gap of three years between IFLS2 and IFLS3 and seven years 
between IFLS3 and IFLS4, this gives a close enough approximation to strict exogeneity. 
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Table 2 Overall mean of relative income, education and age by ethnicity  
Variable Definition Batak Javanese Minangkabau Comparison of Batak 
and Javanese 
Comparison of Batak 
and Minangkabau 
Comparison of 
Javanese and 
Minangkabau 
Mean Mean Mean Difference 
of means 
t-statistics Difference 
of means 
t-
statistics 
Difference 
of means 
t-
statistics 
Relative 
income 
Ratio of mother’s 
income to 
household income 
 
0.3055 0.3374 0.3610 -0.0319 -1.7445 -0.0555 -2.0455 -0.0236 -1.3078 
Relative 
education 
Dummy variable, 1 
indicates mothers 
are more educated 
than fathers 
 
15.25* 12.22* 21.66* 0.0303 2.0026 -0.0641 -2.7279 -0.0944 -6.4440 
Relative age Ratio of mother’s 
age to father’s age 
0.9301 0.8807 0.8914 0.0494 10.2852 0.0387 6.0093 -0.0107 -2.3626 
*This measure reflects percentage =1
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Relative income 
Relative income has been used as a proxy for women’s agency because it can affect how 
much bargaining power each spouse has within the household (Felkey, 2013; Kambhampati, 
2009). However, this variable is problematic because it is endogenous to decisions made 
within the household (Basu, 2006) and it also cannot capture cooperative and competitive 
interests in the household or slow moving social norms (Mabsout & van Staveren, 2010). In 
recent years, therefore, this variable has fallen out of favor. Despite this, we begin with an 
estimation that includes this variable to provide comparability with existing studies. We 
formulate relative income as the ratio of mothers’ income to household income using wage 
income from the previous year. As expected, Minangkabau mothers contributed the largest 
proportion of household income (about 36%) followed by the Javanese (34%) and Batak 
(31%). These differences are statistically significant (Table 2) confirming that, as measured 
by their contribution to household income, Batak women have the least agency amongst 
our three groups. Also, despite being matrilineal, Minangkabau women do not contribute 
more than their husbands.  
Relative education 
Relative education has been used to measure female autonomy (Andersen, Bulte, Gneezy, & 
List, 2008; Anderson & Eswaran, 2009; Basu & Ray, 2002; Imai, Annim, Kulkarni, & Gaiha, 
2014; Mabsout & van Staveren, 2010; Quisumbing, 2003) because educated women are 
seen as having outside options and as better able to bargain effectively within the 
household. This variable takes a value of one where the mothers’ education level is higher 
based on the highest level of schooling completed by both spouses. Across all ethnic groups, 
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only 13% of the women had more education than their spouses although this varies from 
12% for the Javanese to 15% for the Batak and 22% for the Minangkabau. As expected, 
although more Minangkabau women are better educated than their spouse compared to 
Batak and Javanese women, the majority of men in all the groups are better educated than 
their wives. Since education is largely undertaken prior to marriage, this variable is likely to 
be exogenous but time invariant necessitating a pooled estimation with time dummies. 
Relative age 
Women who are younger than their husbands are likely to have less agency and 
independence, especially in Indonesia where power is linked to gender and seniority. We 
include relative age as the ratio of mothers’ to fathers’ age (Anderson & Eswaran, 2009; 
Kritz & Makinwa-Adebusoye, 1999; Mabsout & van Staveren, 2010), so a value of one 
indicates husbands and wives are the same age and values greater than one indicate women 
are older than their husbands. There are significant differences across the groups, with 
Batak women being closer in age to their husbands than either Javanese or Minangkabau 
women. This could indicate that Batak women have more agency compared to Javanese and 
Minangkabau women, using this particular measure.  
We include these measures in our first estimation (Table 4) which enables comparison with 
results from existing literature. Before we do this, we consider our preferred agency 
variables in the next section. 
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Direct measures of agency 
We now turn to household decision making, a more direct measure of agency (Anderson & 
Eswaran, 2009; Garikipati, 2008; Jejeebhoy, 2002; Rammohan & Johar, 2009). We chose this 
measure as it reflects the influence and authority each spouse wields (Anderson & Eswaran, 
2009).  
Decision-making in this paper broadly covers two household domains: child-related 
decisions12 and financial decisions (on large and small13 household expenditures, cash and 
gift-giving14 and savings). Our decision-making variables are a series of dummy variables for 
decisions made solely by fathers, solely by mothers or jointly with their spouse. We estimate 
a separate regression for each of these decision-makers. We will discuss these variables in 
more detail below in two categories – decisions relating to finances and to children. 
                                                          
12 This is education, health and clothing. 
13 Small expenditure is food and on routine household purchases. 
14 This is to own family and in-laws and gift giving for celebrations. 
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Table 3a Descriptive statistics for father-only decision-making variables by ethnicity 
VARIABLES Father-only decisions 
Children's 
clothes 
Children's 
education 
Children's 
health 
Monthly 
ROSCA 
Monthly 
savings 
Food 
expenditure 
at home 
Routine 
household 
purchases 
Giving 
money to 
own family 
Giving 
money to 
in-laws 
Giving 
gifts 
Large, 
expensive 
household 
purchases 
All ethnicities 5.41% 8.72% 7.40% 5.72% 7.46% 8.26% 6.89% 10.28% 6.64% 8.07% 15.09% 
Batak 4.48% 5.66% 4.01% 3.08% 4.74% 4.48% 6.13% 6.15% 5.20% 6.37% 13.48% 
Javanese 4.62% 8.01% 7.03% 7.42% 8.05% 8.12% 6.53% 10.55% 7.25% 8.85% 15.01% 
Minangkabau 7.61% 9.47% 7.41% 3.09% 7.82% 17.28% 11.52% 18.52% 7.61% 9.07% 15.29% 
Table 3b Descriptive statistics for mother-only decision-making variables by ethnicity 
VARIABLES Mother-only decisions 
Children's 
clothes 
Children's 
education 
Children's 
health 
Monthly 
ROSCA 
Monthly 
savings 
Food 
expenditure 
at home 
Routine 
household 
purchases 
Giving 
money to 
own family 
Giving 
money to 
in-laws 
Giving 
gifts 
Large, 
expensive 
household 
purchases 
All ethnicities 29.21% 10.24% 12.89% 21.35% 10.36% 69.97% 68.71% 9.09% 6.64% 17.31% 6.15% 
Batak 41.51% 14.41% 15.45% 17.54% 7.74% 67.01% 72.03% 7.52% 6.05% 18.58% 10.48% 
Javanese 29.78% 10.14% 13.40% 24.93% 12.11% 74.09% 71.26% 9.68% 7.57% 17.19% 6.43% 
Minangkabau 21.38% 8.36% 8.36% 15.61% 8.57% 53.16% 55.20% 10.97% 5.20% 21.00% 5.85% 
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Table 3c Descriptive statistics for joint-father decision-making variables by ethnicity 
VARIABLES Decisions by fathers – solely and jointly 
Children's 
clothes 
Children's 
education 
Children's 
health 
Monthly 
ROSCA 
Monthly 
savings 
Food 
expenditure 
at home 
Routine 
household 
purchases 
Giving 
money to 
own family 
Giving 
money to 
in-laws 
Giving 
gifts 
Large, 
expensive 
household 
purchases 
All ethnicities 56.91% 77.17% 80.95% 36.75% 37.39% 29.57% 29.23% 84.01% 82.83% 85.12% 89.50% 
Batak 57.55% 77.83% 80.90% 31.75% 39.10% 32.31% 29.95% 89.13% 87.23% 81.60% 90.78% 
Javanese 56.44% 79.21% 82.31% 45.37% 39.01% 26.63% 27.06% 84.90% 84.44% 85.51% 91.40% 
Minangkabau 67.70% 81.07% 83.33% 33.13% 38.27% 48.97% 46.30% 81.07% 73.87% 81.65% 89.05% 
Table 3d Descriptive statistics for joint-mother decision-making variables by ethnicity 
VARIABLES Decisions by mothers – solely and jointly 
Children's 
clothes 
Children's 
education 
Children's 
health 
Monthly 
ROSCA 
Monthly 
savings 
Food 
expenditure 
at home 
Routine 
household 
purchases 
Giving 
money to 
own family 
Giving 
money to 
in-laws 
Giving 
gifts 
Large, 
expensive 
household 
purchases 
All ethnicities 80.57% 80.70% 87.09% 53.00% 40.09% 90.59% 91.19% 85.12% 81.97% 94.14% 81.57% 
Batak 89.31% 89.56% 92.90% 45.09% 42.68% 93.53% 94.57% 85.18% 83.72% 96.66% 86.79% 
Javanese 81.61% 83.25% 89.00% 63.05% 43.84% 91.57% 91.46% 86.42% 83.40% 94.25% 84.63% 
Minangkabau 80.86% 83.09% 88.29% 49.63% 40.78% 86.06% 88.85% 79.74% 72.49% 93.49% 84.91% 
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The financial decisions 
Across all the ethnic groups we find that mothers are more likely to make savings-related 
decisions on their own than fathers (see Tables 3a and 3b), in particular on ROSCAs, an 
informal savings mechanism (Wydick, 2008).  
In Indonesia, ceremonial gift giving and transfers of money within the extended family are a 
common occurrence (Park, 2003). As seen in Table 3, mothers are more likely to make these 
decisions on their own than fathers across all ethnic groups, especially amongst the 
matrilineal Minangkabau. Both Javanese and Minangkabau women are economically active 
and typically have responsibility for maintaining social relationships (Esten, 1993; Sanday, 
2002; Weix, 2000; Wolf, 2000) which would explain this. While fathers are more likely to 
make decisions relating to large and expensive household purchases on their own for all 
ethnic groups, mothers make all small and routine household expenditure decisions albeit 
less amongst the Minangkabau.  
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Decisions relating to children 
Children provide a key sphere of household decision-making and Table 3 indicates that 
mothers from all ethnic groups are more likely to make child-related decisions on their own, 
with fathers least likely to make decisions relating to children’s clothing. While the most 
common approach is joint decision-making, particularly for child health and education 
decisions, Batak women and Minangkabau men are more likely to make these decisions 
than their counterparts in the other groups.  
In the next section, we will consider the extent to which these autonomy variables influence 
household education expenditure. 
4. Results 
As mentioned earlier, we estimate two versions of our model – the first with relative 
income, age and education as indirect proxies for agency and the second with the decision-
making variables discussed above. Since relative education is time invariant and the 
variability in relative age is limited, we estimate the model which includes these variables as 
a pooled data model with time dummies rather than as a panel fixed effects model (see 
Table 4).  
The second version of the model with decision making variables as proxies for agency is 
estimated as a panel fixed effects model (Tables 5 and 5a). All our estimations include the 
following controls: household income, asset ownership, parent’s education levels, number 
of children in the household, parent’s employment status, ethnicity and religion. The results 
for our control variables are not presented below to keep the size of tables manageable. 
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Table 4 Household education expenditure estimation results – indirect proxies for agency 
VARIABLES 
Household education expenditure (quasi-pooled) 
Model 1 
All ethnicities Batak Javanese Minangkabau 
Relative income 0.0554*** 0.1399** 0.0438** 0.0977 
  [0.013] [0.067] [0.018] [0.062] 
Relative age 0.0702** 0.0517 0.0993** 0.3036** 
  [0.030] [0.149] [0.045] [0.148] 
Relative education 0.0481*** 0.1385* 0.0689*** -0.0402 
  [0.013] [0.071] [0.020] [0.061] 
Control variables included15 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0670 -0.3747 -0.0151 -0.4407 
  [0.058] [0.317] [0.084] [0.320] 
Observations 6,230 228 2,831 240 
R-squared 0.356 0.45 0.392 0.457 
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We use a linear regression with time fixed effects using IFLS2 as the base 
4.1 The indirect measures of agency 
As seen in Table 4, when we consider all ethnic groups together, each of our measures of 
agency has a different impact on household education expenditure. When women 
contribute relatively more to household income, there is a 5.5% increase in household 
spending on education. Similarly, when women are relatively better educated, household 
spending on education increases by 4.8%. Our results here are similar to other research 
which finds women’s agency to be an important determinant of the use of household 
resources (for example Abadian, 1996; Blumberg, 1988; Hoddinott & Haddad, 1991, 1995; 
Kabeer, 1997, 1999; Quisumbing, 2003; Seebens & Sauer, 2007; Thomas, 1990, 1993).  
However, when we consider each of the ethnic groups separately, we find several 
differences. Amongst the matrilineal Minangkabau, relative age is the most significant 
measure of autonomy, increasing household expenditure on education by 30.4% while 
                                                          
15 Control variables are religion, parents’ education, parents’ employment, household income, ownership of 
assets and number of children in the household by age  
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amongst the Batak, relative income and relative education are both significant. Household 
expenditure on education increases by 14.0% when Batak women earn more than their 
husbands and by 13.9% when they are better educated. 
It is only among the Javanese that all three indirect measures of women’s agency have a 
significant impact on household education. When Javanese women contribute relatively 
more to household income there is a 4.4% increase and when they are older than their 
spouses there is almost a 10.0% increase in education expenditure.  
Our results therefore indicate that autonomy is captured differently in the different groups 
as Beegle et al. (2001) also found for Indonesia. These results are limited by the broad 
nature of these autonomy variables and by the fact that with relative education being time 
invariant, it is not possible to estimate the model using panel fixed effects. We have instead 
included a time dummy to capture macro changes and changes in norms across time. We 
now turn to our main model estimated with decision making as our measure of autonomy. 
4.2 The direct measures of agency 
In Tables 5and 5a, we provide a summary of the net impact of decisions made by various 
agents within the household on household education expenditure.  
To make the tables simpler to read, we report only significant results (see Appendix for 
complete results). 
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Table 5 Net impact of significant individual decision-making on household education expenditure! 
Decision variable Model 2 
Mothers' only Fathers' only 
All 
ethnicities 
Batak Javanese Minangkabau All ethnicities Batak Javanese Minangkabau 
Children's clothes             0.0499*  
[0.028] 
  
Children's education 0.0352** 
[0.016] 
0.1041* 
[0.063] 
    0.0404** 
[0.017] 
-0.3560*** 
[0.057] 
0.0429* 
[0.025] 
-0.1579* 
[0.083] 
Children's health           0.1932** 
[0.077] 
    
Monthly ROSCA         -0.0273* 
[0.015] 
  -0.0537*** 
[0.021] 
0.2081** 
[0.087] 
Monthly savings   -0.1873*** 
[0.069] 
  -0.1926*** 
[0.067] 
        
Food expenditure at home   -0.0823* 
[0.044] 
            
Routine household purchases   0.0826* 
[0.049] 
            
Giving money to own family           0.3252*** 
[0.075] 
  -0.1222** 
[0.061] 
Giving money to in-laws           -0.2651*** 
[0.078] 
    
Giving gifts   0.1067** 
[0.052] 
            
Large, expensive household purchases                 
Control variables included16 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Net effect 0.0352 0.0238   -0.1926 0.0131 -0.1027 0.0391 -0.0738 
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ! Coefficients that are not significant at least at the 10% level are not presented in the table
                                                          
16 Control variables are religion, parents’ education, parents’ employment, household income, ownership of assets and number of children in the household by age  
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Table 5a Net impact of joint significant decision-making on household education expenditure! 
Decision variable Model 2a 
Mothers' only and joint Fathers' only and joint 
All ethnicities Batak Javanese Minangkabau All ethnicities Batak Javanese Minangkabau 
Children's clothes 0.0231** 
[0.011] 
        -0.1101*** 
[0.040] 
    
Children's education 0.1019*** 
[0.011] 
  0.0979*** 
[0.018] 
  0.0892*** 
[0.011] 
  0.0804*** 
[0.018] 
  
Children's health -0.0306** 
[0.015] 
  -0.0624*** 
[0.024] 
  -0.0399*** 
[0.013] 
0.2064*** 
[0.058] 
-0.0408** 
[0.019] 
  
Monthly ROSCA -0.0150* 
[0.008] 
              
Monthly savings     0.0232** 
[0.011] 
-0.1169** 
[0.054] 
  0.0850* 
[0.049] 
    
Food expenditure at home       0.1982*** 
[0.073] 
  0.1328** 
[0.060] 
    
Routine household purchases       -0.1978*** 
[0.076] 
        
Giving money to own family           0.2302*** 
[0.069] 
  -0.1144** 
[0.057] 
Giving money to in-laws           -0.1319** 
[0.065] 
  0.1745*** 
[0.051] 
Giving gifts 0.0244* 
[0.015] 
0.2279** 
[0.092] 
        0.0274* 
[0.015] 
  
Large, expensive household purchases               -0.1628** 
[0.067] 
Control variables included17 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Net effect 0.1038 0.2279 0.0587 -0.1165 0.0493 0.4124 0.067 -0.1027 
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ! Coefficients that are not significant at least at the 10% level are not presented in the table 
                                                          
17 Control variables are religion, parents’ education, parents’ employment, household income, ownership of assets and number of children in the household by age 
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Table 5 presents the results for individual only decision making (mother only and father 
only) while Table 5a includes joint decision-making (i.e. mother only and joint decision 
making and father only and joint decision making). We calculate the net effect by summing 
the significant coefficients for decisions made by mothers and by fathers alone (Table 5) or 
in conjunction with others (Table 5a). This gives us an overall ‘net’ impact of decisions made 
by mothers or fathers on household education expenditure. 
4.2.1 Agency of the dominant spouse 
From Table 5 we see that, in general, when the dominant spouse has sole control of 
decision-making, there is an overall negative impact on education expenditure. This is the 
case for mother-only decision making amongst the Minangkabau and father-only decision 
making amongst the Batak where education expenditure is 19.3% lower and 10.3% lower 
respectively. Our results in Table 5 therefore show that mothers’ sole control over decision-
making does not always guarantee the best outcome for household welfare.   
When Minangkabau mothers make decisions, there is only one decision that has a 
significant impact on household expenditure on education – monthly savings. Amongst the 
Minangkabau, there is a 19.3% fall in total household education expenditure when mothers 
make monthly savings decisions. There are parallels here between the results of 
Minangkabau mothers’ and Batak fathers’ sole decision-making though in each case 
different decisions are significant. When Batak fathers have sole control over children’s 
education decisions and giving money to their in-laws, there is a 35.6% and 26.5% decrease 
in household education expenditure respectively, offset by greater education spending 
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when they make decisions relating to children’s health and giving money to their own 
family.  
Household education expenditure increases when Batak mothers make decisions about 
children’s education while Minangkabau fathers’ decision-making has a smaller negative 
impact on education expenditure (-7.4%) compared to Minangkabau mothers (-19.3%). 
Amongst Javanese mothers, no decision-making variables are significant. But, when fathers 
make decisions about children’s education, this has a positive impact on household 
expenditure on education only amongst the Javanese. In the other two groups, fathers’ 
decision making in this domain has a negative impact on education expenditure, albeit less 
so for Minangkabau fathers.  
These results indicate it might be more important to consider the issue of dominance, 
rather than gender alone. Outcomes are less good in communities where either men or 
women are dominant. In these communities, increasing the agency of the weaker spouse 
can be beneficial – mother only decision-making among the Batak increases education 
expenditure by 2.4% while father only decision making amongst the Minangkabau has a 
smaller negative effect. Thus, there is some evidence that a more equal distribution of 
power is better for household welfare. We turn now to consider the impact of joint 
decision-making on outcomes. 
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4.2.2 Shared agency 
Compared to mother or father-only decision-making, we find that joint decision-making by 
mothers and fathers with their spouses results in greater household expenditure on 
education.  
We compare decision-making just by mothers (Table 5, columns 2 – 5) to decision-making 
by mothers and joint decision-making (Table 5a, columns 2 – 5). When looking at all the 
ethnic groups together, household education expenditure is 10.4% higher when mothers are 
involved (either singly or jointly) in decision-making. This is higher than the 3.5% effects for 
mother-only decision-making in Table 5. This is seen across all the ethnic groups. In 
particular, among the Batak where mother and joint-decision-making increases education 
expenditure by 22.8% (Table 5a) compared to 2.4% (Table 5) when decisions are made 
solely by mothers and -10.3% when decisions are made by fathers only (Table 5). 
This is also the case when comparing father-only decision making (Table 5) with father and 
joint decision-making (Table 5a). Here, the largest impact is seen amongst the Batak. When 
fathers make decisions alone, total household education expenditure decreases by 10.3%. 
However, when decisions are made either by fathers alone or by fathers jointly with 
mothers, total household education expenditure increases by 41.2%. 
These results confirm that it might not be the gender of the parent that is most important 
for household welfare outcomes but rather his or her relative power. In particular, joint 
decision-making of this kind is most beneficial for household expenditure on education 
amongst the Batak. It is least impactful amongst the Minangkabau, where it continues to 
lead to decreases in education expenditure. However, even within this group when mothers 
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make joint decisions, the magnitude of the reduction in expenditure decreases from -19.3% 
to -11.7%. This is true also for Javanese where joint decision-making increases education 
expenditure significantly. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of women’s agency on household expenditure on 
education in Indonesia. We were especially interested in whether it was women’s agency 
per se or increased agency for the less dominant spouse in a household that would 
positively affect household education expenditure.  
Indonesia was a good case in which to study this because gender norms vary across 
ethnicities which allowed us to study this issue across matrilineal and patrilineal groups. 
With men being relatively less dominant in the former and women in the latter, an analysis 
spread across these groups allowed us to consider the role of gender compared to 
dominance in determining household welfare outcomes. We tested the impact of agency on 
household expenditure on education using three rounds of the IFLS dataset.  
We used two types of agency measures – those which are broad proxy indicators (relative 
income of the spouses, relative education and relative age) and more detailed decision 
making variables. We found that while the former allowed us to broadly conclude on 
whether mother’s autonomy influences household expenditure on education, it did not let 
us identify the precise sphere in which such autonomy is effective. It also did not let us 
consider the relative role of the less dominant spouse (mothers amongst the Batak and 
fathers amongst the Minangkabau). The decision-making variables, on the other hand, 
allowed us to do this and as such were a significant methodological improvement on the 
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indirect proxies. These decision-making variables also allowed us to capture changes in 
decision making norms over time and thereby allowed us to capture the effect of these 
changes. 
Our results indicate that household welfare is increased not by women’s agency alone but 
by greater co-operation between the spouses. In fact, when the dominant spouse has sole 
control of decision-making, there is a decrease in education expenditure. This is true both 
for mothers who are dominant (in the Minangkabau group) as well as for fathers (amongst 
the Batak). Our results suggest a more nuanced approach to empowerment is needed – in 
particular, it is important to consider the issue of dominance rather than wholly focusing on 
gender. These results are similar to (Basu & Ray, 2002) findings that there would be more 
child labor in households with greater levels of gender inequality. When the benefits of child 
work are spread across the parents and there is parental congruence in goals, then we can 
expect an improvement in household welfare. Cooperation also reduces selfishness as the 
communication and information sharing needed to make decisions together reduces the 
opportunities for selfish behavior thereby affecting how household resources are used.  
Our results might relate to the fact that Indonesia is a middle-income country with relatively 
equitable gender relations. While it increases household welfare to empower women in 
poor patriarchal and patrilineal societies, this is largely because women are the less 
empowered partners in these communities. Such empowerment therefore leads to more 
equitable household relations. On the other hand, in communities that are matrilineal or 
where more equal gender relations are the norm, further increasing mother’s power would 
not necessarily be beneficial. In these communities, it would be important to work towards 
greater equality within the household.  
36 
 
Appendix 1 
Table 6 Full estimation results of household education expenditure for Model 2a 
  
VARIABLES 
Father only Mother only  
All 
ethnicities 
Batak Javanese Minangkabau All 
ethnicities 
Batak Javanese Minangkabau 
Christian: Father -0.0411 0.1217 0.1531**   -0.0334   0.0857   
Base: Islam [0.059] [0.219] [0.069]   [0.058]   [0.075]   
Other religion: Father -0.1312   0.2208**   -0.0932   0.2280***   
Base: Islam [0.095]   [0.088]   [0.085]   [0.087]   
Christian: Mother -0.0105 0.0224 -0.2049*   -0.0437 -0.0506 -0.2424**   
Base: Islam [0.069] [0.069] [0.106]   [0.069] [0.077] [0.120]   
Other religion: Mother 0.0142   -0.3523*** -0.0945 -0.0097   -0.3483*** -0.1792 
Base: Islam [0.084]   [0.032] [0.129] [0.084]   [0.035] [0.137] 
Number of children: boys primary age (HH) 0.1206*** 0.0375 0.1303*** 0.1059*** 0.1232*** 0.0257 0.1377*** 0.1068*** 
  [0.006] [0.042] [0.010] [0.026] [0.006] [0.032] [0.010] [0.027] 
Number of children: girls primary age (HH) 0.1178*** 0.0354 0.1213*** 0.0906** 0.1210*** 0.0314 0.1251*** 0.0956*** 
  [0.007] [0.032] [0.010] [0.041] [0.006] [0.032] [0.010] [0.035] 
Number of children: boys junior high age 
(HH) 
0.1050*** 0.0388 0.1046*** 0.1747*** 0.1042*** 0.0643* 0.1091*** 0.1441*** 
  [0.008] [0.045] [0.013] [0.047] [0.008] [0.037] [0.013] [0.043] 
Number of children: girls junior high age 
(HH) 
0.1089*** 0.0404 0.1391*** 0.1205** 0.1105*** 0.1013** 0.1361*** 0.1216** 
  [0.009] [0.044] [0.013] [0.060] [0.008] [0.041] [0.013] [0.049] 
Number of children: boys senior high age 
(HH) 
0.0865*** 0.1160** 0.0988*** 0.0971* 0.0826*** 0.0359 0.0991*** 0.0801 
  [0.009] [0.056] [0.014] [0.052] [0.009] [0.045] [0.013] [0.060] 
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Number of children: girls senior high age 
(HH) 
0.0780*** 0.0407 0.0808*** 0.0618 0.0769*** 0.1032** 0.0828*** 0.0257 
  [0.010] [0.043] [0.015] [0.051] [0.010] [0.041] [0.015] [0.054] 
Number of children: boys tertiary 
education age (HH) 
0.0419*** 0.0936* 0.0356** 0.1230** 0.0402*** 0.1106** 0.0355** 0.0817 
  [0.010] [0.048] [0.015] [0.049] [0.010] [0.043] [0.015] [0.055] 
Number of children: girls tertiary 
education age (HH) 
0.0425*** 0.0801 0.0361** 0.0880 0.0382*** 0.0820* 0.0263 0.0867 
  [0.011] [0.050] [0.017] [0.070] [0.011] [0.045] [0.016] [0.076] 
Wife's education: primary 0.0132 0.0555 0.0045 0.0722 0.0057 0.2475* -0.0068 0.1149 
Base: no education [0.020] [0.096] [0.028] [0.077] [0.020] [0.127] [0.028] [0.084] 
Wife's education: junior high 0.0184 0.1243 -0.0107 -0.0527 0.0076 0.2449 -0.0389 -0.0094 
Base: no education [0.032] [0.128] [0.048] [0.139] [0.031] [0.160] [0.048] [0.120] 
Wife's education: senior high -0.0131 0.2070 -0.1321 0.1650 -0.0168 0.2391 -0.1138 0.1906 
Base: no education [0.044] [0.209] [0.080] [0.132] [0.041] [0.174] [0.075] [0.133] 
Wife's education: tertiary 0.0113 0.3782 -0.2415** 0.2258 0.0085 0.3051 -0.1965** 0.1605 
Base: no education [0.057] [0.250] [0.097] [0.229] [0.053] [0.203] [0.094] [0.230] 
Husband's education: junior high 0.0337 0.1675*** 0.0377 -0.0205 0.0226 0.0761 0.0207 -0.0437 
Base: no education or primary only [0.021] [0.063] [0.032] [0.085] [0.020] [0.058] [0.033] [0.069] 
Husband's education: senior high 0.0299 0.3084*** 0.0929* 0.1012 0.0170 0.0751 0.0573 0.0413 
Base: no education or primary only [0.030] [0.117] [0.051] [0.109] [0.029] [0.130] [0.051] [0.087] 
Husband's education: tertiary 0.0861** 0.4497*** 0.1858** 0.1764 0.0657* 0.3782** 0.1463* 0.1425 
Base: no education or primary only [0.041] [0.164] [0.078] [0.139] [0.039] [0.188] [0.076] [0.149] 
Employed: husband 0.0440*** 0.1600** 0.0403** 0.1020 0.0083 0.0710 0.0077 0.0254 
  [0.014] [0.080] [0.020] [0.087] [0.013] [0.087] [0.020] [0.082] 
Employed: wife 0.0008 -0.0673 0.0189 -0.0831* 0.0016 -0.0737* 0.0161 -0.0526 
  [0.008] [0.059] [0.013] [0.043] [0.008] [0.042] [0.012] [0.045] 
Ownership of house 0.0307** 0.0309 0.0381** -0.0476 0.0235** 0.0432 0.0342* -0.0532 
  [0.012] [0.081] [0.019] [0.052] [0.011] [0.061] [0.018] [0.050] 
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Inflation adjusted log of total household 
income  
-0.0236*** -0.0187 -0.0402*** -0.0422** -0.0232*** -0.0138 -0.0407*** -0.0402** 
  [0.003] [0.019] [0.004] [0.020] [0.003] [0.017] [0.004] [0.016] 
Fathers-only decision: Children's clothes 0.0080 -0.0382 0.0499* 0.0131 0.0008 -0.0562 -0.0118 0.0335 
  [0.018] [0.061] [0.028] [0.071] [0.009] [0.043] [0.014] [0.067] 
Fathers-only decision: Children's education 0.0404** -0.3560*** 0.0429* -0.1579* 0.0352** 0.1041* 0.0260 -0.0494 
  [0.017] [0.057] [0.025] [0.083] [0.016] [0.063] [0.024] [0.103] 
Fathers-only decision: Children's health 0.0079 0.1932** -0.0096 0.0120 -0.0130 -0.0176 -0.0219 0.0606 
  [0.018] [0.077] [0.027] [0.090] [0.015] [0.050] [0.022] [0.102] 
Fathers-only decision: monthly ROSCA -0.0273* -0.0962 -0.0537*** 0.2081** 0.0023 0.0150 -0.0040 0.0793 
  [0.015] [0.111] [0.021] [0.087] [0.009] [0.048] [0.013] [0.052] 
Fathers-only decision: monthly savings -0.0050 0.0450 0.0190 -0.1122 -0.0102 -0.1873*** 0.0107 -0.1926*** 
  [0.014] [0.098] [0.021] [0.081] [0.012] [0.069] [0.016] [0.067] 
Fathers-only decision: food expenditure at 
home 
-0.0105 -0.1250 0.0076 -0.0293 -0.0002 -0.0823* 0.0027 0.0478 
  [0.015] [0.143] [0.023] [0.062] [0.010] [0.044] [0.015] [0.044] 
Fathers-only decision: routine household 
purchases 
-0.0144 0.1004 -0.0304 0.0746 0.0014 0.0826* 0.0031 -0.0508 
  [0.017] [0.111] [0.025] [0.074] [0.010] [0.049] [0.014] [0.049] 
Fathers-only decision: giving money to 
own family 
-0.0156 0.3252*** -0.0144 -0.1222** -0.0005 -0.0508 -0.0144 0.0421 
  [0.014] [0.075] [0.022] [0.061] [0.015] [0.090] [0.022] [0.072] 
Fathers-only decision: giving money to in-
laws 
0.0028 -0.2651*** 0.0027 0.0973 -0.0093 0.0134 0.0196 0.1334 
  [0.017] [0.078] [0.025] [0.064] [0.016] [0.095] [0.023] [0.087] 
Fathers-only decision: giving gifts 0.0078 0.1198 0.0032 0.0308 0.0000 0.1067** -0.0174 -0.0079 
  [0.014] [0.076] [0.020] [0.082] [0.010] [0.052] [0.014] [0.042] 
Fathers-only decision: large, expensive 
household purchases 
0.0039 0.0075 -0.0133 0.0226 -0.0010 -0.0658 0.0123 -0.0521 
  [0.011] [0.059] [0.016] [0.056] [0.015] [0.060] [0.021] [0.095] 
Disagreement in answers to all decisions -0.0020*** -0.0056 -0.0017* 0.0014 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0010 
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by fathers and mothers 
  [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.003] [0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] 
Constant 0.4544*** -0.0108 0.7106*** 0.6514** 0.4859*** 0.1039 0.7615*** 0.6680** 
  [0.052] [0.299] [0.077] [0.305] [0.052] [0.327] [0.076] [0.282] 
Observations 12,880 407 5,311 446 13,525 458 5,479 487 
R-squared 0.217 0.324 0.267 0.456 0.210 0.269 0.257 0.366 
Number of hhid2 7,367 238 2,943 271 7,649 262 3,013 292 
F test 35.66 . . . 36.33 . . . 
prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, HH indicates household level variables 
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Table 7 Full estimation results of household education expenditure for Model 2b 
  
VARIABLES 
Father only and joint Mother only and joint 
All 
ethnicities 
Batak Javanese Minangkabau All 
ethnicities 
Batak Javanese Minangkabau 
Christian: Father -0.0383 0.1269 0.1359**   -0.0192   0.0921   
Base: Islam [0.058] [0.204] [0.067]   [0.059]   [0.075]   
Other religion: Father -0.1203   0.1832***   -0.0864   0.2148***   
Base: Islam [0.095]   [0.070]   [0.090]   [0.080]   
Christian: Mother -0.0235 0.1463* -0.2159**   -0.0514 -0.0287 -0.2446**   
Base: Islam [0.069] [0.083] [0.105]   [0.068] [0.063] [0.113]   
Other religion: Mother 0.0096   -0.2880*** -0.2833** -0.0237   -0.3070*** -0.2018 
Base: Islam [0.086]   [0.040] [0.126] [0.082]   [0.037] [0.147] 
Number of children: boys primary age 
(HH) 
0.1149*** 0.0482 0.1265*** 0.1279*** 0.1155*** 0.0154 0.1320*** 0.1198*** 
  [0.006] [0.035] [0.010] [0.025] [0.006] [0.035] [0.010] [0.027] 
Number of children: girls primary age 
(HH) 
0.1126*** 0.0343 0.1189*** 0.0975** 0.1129*** 0.0162 0.1186*** 0.0738** 
  [0.007] [0.030] [0.010] [0.038] [0.006] [0.027] [0.010] [0.033] 
Number of children: boys junior high 
age (HH) 
0.1049*** 0.0608 0.1055*** 0.1632*** 0.1034*** 0.0410 0.1124*** 0.1303*** 
  [0.008] [0.043] [0.013] [0.051] [0.008] [0.039] [0.013] [0.043] 
Number of children: girls junior high 
age (HH) 
0.1087*** 0.0297 0.1393*** 0.1368** 0.1092*** 0.1168*** 0.1320*** 0.0900* 
  [0.009] [0.041] [0.013] [0.058] [0.008] [0.039] [0.013] [0.047] 
Number of children: boys senior high 
age (HH) 
0.0851*** 0.1197** 0.0980*** 0.1071* 0.0819*** 0.0443 0.0986*** 0.0720 
  [0.009] [0.051] [0.014] [0.055] [0.009] [0.046] [0.013] [0.056] 
Number of children: girls senior high 0.0764*** 0.0279 0.0823*** 0.0851* 0.0750*** 0.1025** 0.0809*** 0.0283 
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age (HH) 
  [0.010] [0.042] [0.014] [0.049] [0.010] [0.044] [0.014] [0.052] 
Number of children: boys tertiary 
education age (HH) 
0.0406*** 0.0967* 0.0349** 0.1175** 0.0396*** 0.0969** 0.0388** 0.1072* 
  [0.010] [0.051] [0.015] [0.056] [0.010] [0.047] [0.015] [0.056] 
Number of children: girls tertiary 
education age (HH) 
0.0426*** 0.0585 0.0392** 0.0824 0.0388*** 0.0576 0.0253 0.1103* 
  [0.011] [0.049] [0.016] [0.066] [0.011] [0.052] [0.016] [0.065] 
Wife's education: primary 0.0189 -0.0551 0.0131 0.1641** 0.0111 0.3292*** -0.0064 0.1170* 
Base: no education [0.020] [0.081] [0.028] [0.077] [0.020] [0.107] [0.028] [0.070] 
Wife's education: junior high 0.0227 -0.1441 -0.0077 0.0571 0.0152 0.3420** -0.0284 -0.0138 
Base: no education [0.031] [0.140] [0.048] [0.134] [0.031] [0.152] [0.048] [0.087] 
Wife's education: senior high -0.0067 -0.1165 -0.1320 0.2175 -0.0129 0.3701** -0.1018 0.1667 
Base: no education [0.044] [0.188] [0.080] [0.142] [0.040] [0.153] [0.075] [0.107] 
Wife's education: tertiary 0.0165 0.1211 -0.2392** 0.3246 0.0139 0.4875*** -0.1798* 0.1685 
Base: no education [0.058] [0.237] [0.098] [0.228] [0.053] [0.186] [0.095] [0.191] 
Husband's education: junior high 0.0296 0.1432** 0.0416 -0.0149 0.0175 0.1036 0.0220 -0.0413 
Base: no education or primary only [0.021] [0.072] [0.032] [0.087] [0.020] [0.068] [0.032] [0.065] 
Husband's education: senior high 0.0264 0.2497** 0.0988* 0.0626 0.0115 0.0856 0.0603 0.0392 
Base: no education or primary only [0.030] [0.103] [0.051] [0.108] [0.028] [0.120] [0.049] [0.082] 
Husband's education: tertiary 0.0781* 0.5404*** 0.1883** 0.1815 0.0544 0.3479** 0.1477* 0.1664 
Base: no education or primary only [0.041] [0.159] [0.078] [0.158] [0.038] [0.169] [0.076] [0.149] 
Employed: husband 0.0453*** 0.0690 0.0391* 0.1269 0.0087 0.0270 0.0048 0.0178 
  [0.014] [0.079] [0.021] [0.095] [0.013] [0.085] [0.019] [0.078] 
Employed: wife 0.0026 -0.0778 0.0224* -0.0862** 0.0037 -0.0810* 0.0188 -0.0637 
  [0.008] [0.056] [0.012] [0.041] [0.008] [0.044] [0.012] [0.044] 
Ownership of house 0.0267** 0.0382 0.0374** -0.0739 0.0178 0.0449 0.0324* -0.0458 
  [0.012] [0.076] [0.019] [0.049] [0.011] [0.061] [0.018] [0.045] 
Inflation adjusted log of total -0.0260*** -0.0270 -0.0433*** -0.0416** -0.0266*** -0.0243 -0.0427*** -0.0401** 
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household income  
  [0.003] [0.021] [0.004] [0.020] [0.003] [0.017] [0.004] [0.017] 
Fathers-only decision: Children's 
clothes 
0.0002 -0.1101*** 0.0111 -0.0411 0.0231** 0.0559 0.0153 0.0561 
  [0.008] [0.040] [0.012] [0.044] [0.011] [0.073] [0.016] [0.057] 
Fathers-only decision: Children's 
education 
0.0892*** -0.0591 0.0804*** 0.0269 0.1019*** 0.0185 0.0979*** 0.0395 
  [0.011] [0.058] [0.018] [0.059] [0.011] [0.093] [0.018] [0.056] 
Fathers-only decision: Children's health -0.0399*** 0.2064*** -0.0408** 0.0182 -0.0306** 0.0838 -0.0624*** 0.0548 
  [0.013] [0.058] [0.019] [0.064] [0.015] [0.081] [0.024] [0.084] 
Fathers-only decision: monthly ROSCA -0.0016 -0.0667 -0.0040 -0.0552 -0.0150* 0.0125 0.0100 -0.0005 
  [0.008] [0.063] [0.012] [0.045] [0.008] [0.044] [0.013] [0.045] 
Fathers-only decision: monthly savings 0.0053 0.0850* 0.0120 0.0315 0.0036 -0.0094 0.0232** -0.1169** 
  [0.008] [0.049] [0.012] [0.052] [0.008] [0.047] [0.011] [0.054] 
Fathers-only decision: food expenditure 
at home 
-0.0007 0.1328** -0.0102 -0.0541 -0.0080 0.0051 -0.0193 0.1982*** 
  [0.010] [0.060] [0.015] [0.045] [0.015] [0.070] [0.023] [0.073] 
Fathers-only decision: routine 
household purchases 
-0.0059 -0.1033 -0.0119 0.0535 -0.0005 -0.0580 0.0004 -0.1978*** 
  [0.010] [0.065] [0.015] [0.048] [0.015] [0.075] [0.023] [0.076] 
Fathers-only decision: giving money to 
own family 
-0.0137 0.2302*** 0.0073 -0.1144** -0.0182 -0.0849 -0.0195 -0.0785 
  [0.013] [0.069] [0.019] [0.057] [0.012] [0.072] [0.019] [0.059] 
Fathers-only decision: giving money to 
in-laws 
-0.0019 -0.1319** -0.0106 0.1745*** -0.0173 0.0997 -0.0051 0.0567 
  [0.013] [0.065] [0.020] [0.051] [0.012] [0.065] [0.018] [0.064] 
Fathers-only decision: giving gifts -0.0044 0.0401 0.0274* -0.0334 0.0244* 0.2279** 0.0124 -0.0177 
  [0.010] [0.050] [0.015] [0.050] [0.015] [0.092] [0.022] [0.072] 
Fathers-only decision: large, expensive 
household purchases 
-0.0170 0.0774 -0.0252 -0.1628** -0.0146 0.0332 -0.0031 0.0444 
  [0.012] [0.072] [0.019] [0.067] [0.009] [0.044] [0.015] [0.058] 
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Disagreement in answers to all 
decisions by fathers and mothers 
-0.0017*** -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0005 
  [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] 
Constant 0.4895*** 0.0444 0.7166*** 0.6833** 0.5042*** -0.1546 0.7664*** 0.6234** 
  [0.053] [0.318] [0.079] [0.303] [0.053] [0.338] [0.081] [0.268] 
Observations 12,880 407 5,311 446 13,525 458 5,479 487 
R-squared 0.224 0.347 0.272 0.471 0.225 0.264 0.268 0.396 
Number of hhid2 7,367 238 2,943 271 7,649 262 3,013 292 
F test 38.42 . . . 43.08 . . . 
prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, HH indicates household level variables  
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